


# Reverse Engineering

## Class 3

### Executable Binaries




# Binaries Analysis




- Static analysis based on the executable format
  - Exported functions and variables
  - Imported functions and variables
  - Symbols and Strings tables
  - Debug information
- But, not everything is exported and has symbols!

# Binaries Analysis




- When compiling and linking information is lost
  - Function and variables names, comments
  - Variables types
  - Non exported functions location (static) and relocation information
  - Functions parameters
  - This lost may be on purpose: strip a binary for release
  - Compiling is a many-to-many operation
    - Same assembly code, different source code (or viceversa)

# Binaries Analysis




- Static analysis on executable code
  - Disassembly heuristics
  - Functions identification
  - Function parameters identification
  - Local and global variables identification
  - “basic blocks” identification (function flow)
  - Cross-references identification
  - All of this can be automated!

# Binaries Analysis




- Disassembly heuristics
  - Linear Sweep
    - From a starting point (i.e. function symbol, .text section start or binary entry point) a linear disassembly is done
      - Instructions and operands of variable but known length (x86) or fixed length (ARM)
    - i.e. mov, add, push, etc.

# Binaries Analysis




- Disassembly heuristics
  - Recursive Descent
    - Conditional branching (if, while, for, switch)
      - One branch is disassembled and the other one is marked for future disassemble
    - Unconditional branching (jmp, call)
      - Problem: is the jump target known?

# Binaries Analysis



- Disassembly heuristics
  - Recursive Descent
    - Unconditional branching (jmp, call)
      - If we know it, disassemble the target. If not, we have a problem.
      - In a call we assume that a “return” to the next instruction exists. Thus, next address is marked as pending for future disassembly.

# Binaries Analysis




Entry point (known) in binary stream

```
.text:0040101A 68 18 80 41 00
.text:0040101F 8B 45 FC
.text:00401022 50
.text:00401023 FF 15 00 10 41 00
.text:00401029 89 45 F8
.text:0040102C 83 7D F8 00
.text:00401030 74 17
.text:00401032 FF 55 F8
.text:00401035 89 45 F4
.text:00401038 8B 4D F4
.text:0040103B 51
.text:0040103C 68 20 80 41 00
.text:00401041 E8 4A 00 00 00
```

Variable (but known) length for opcodes and operands on this architecture




# Binaries Analysis



```
.text:0040101A 68 18 80 41 00      push    offset ProcName ;
.text:0040101F 8B 45 FC            mov     eax, [ebp+hModule]
.text:00401022 50                  push   eax ;
.text:00401023 FF 15 00 10 41 00  call   ds:GetProcAddress
.text:00401029 89 45 F8            mov     [ebp+var_8], eax
.text:0040102C 83 7D F8 00        cmp     [ebp+var_8], 0
.text:00401030 74 17              jz     short loc_401049
.text:00401032 FF 55 F8            call   [ebp+var_8]
.text:00401035 89 45 F4            mov     [ebp+var_C], eax
.text:00401038 8B 4D F4            mov     ecx, [ebp+var_C]
.text:0040103B 51                  push   ecx
.text:0040103C 68 20 80 41 00      push   offset aReturnD ;
.text:00401041 E8 4A 00 00 00      call   sub_401090
```


# Binaries Analysis



```
.text:0040101A 68 18 80 41 00      push    offset ProcName ;
.text:0040101F 8B 45 FC            mov     eax, [ebp+hModule]
.text:00401022 50                 push    eax ;
.text:00401023 FF 15 00 10 41 00   call   ds:GetProcAddress
.text:00401029 89 45 F8            mov     [ebp+var_8], eax
.text:0040102C 83 7D F8 00        cmp     [ebp+var_8], 0
.text:00401030 74 17              jz     short loc_401049
.text:00401032 FF 55 F8            call   [ebp+var_8]
.text:00401035 89 45 F4            mov     [ebp+var_C], eax
.text:00401038 8B 4D F4            mov     ecx, [ebp+var_C]
.text:0040103B 51                 push    ecx
.text:0040103C 68 20 80 41 00     push    offset aReturnD ;
.text:00401041 E8 4A 00 00 00     call   sub_401090
```


**Where to continue disassembling? CALL to an address held in a local variable, only known in run time**

# Binaries Analysis




- In CISC architectures like x86/x86\_64 (with extended instructions sets), many opcodes may be valid.
- However, not every instruction is equally likely or frequent. Executable binary type may provide hints: are we expecting floating point instructions?
- Can we differentiate an executable binary manually written in assembly from one generated by a compiler? Can we identify idioms or patterns?

# Binaries Analysis



- Compilers tend to use certain instructions more frequently and generate specific patterns following conventions or binary interfaces (ABIs).
- It's important to be able to make a judgment about the correctness of a disassembly
  - And provide a hint to the disassembler regarding where to start.

# Binaries Analysis




- Where should we start disassembling?

```
.text:004012FF      db      0
.text:00401300      db     89h
.text:00401301      db     15h
.text:00401302      db    0D4h
.text:00401303      db     87h
.text:00401304      db     41h
.text:00401305      db      0
.text:00401306      db    0E8h
.text:00401307      db      5
.text:00401308      db    0FFh
.text:00401309      db    0FFh
.text:0040130A      db    0FFh
.text:0040130B      db     83h
.text:0040130C      db    0F8h
.text:0040130D      db    0FFh
.text:0040130E      db     75h
.text:0040130F      db      5
```



# Binaries Analysis



- Does it look correct?

```
.text:004012FE      db  41h ; A
.text:004012FF      db   0
.text:00401300      db  89h ; ë
.text:00401301      db  15h
.text:00401302      ; -----
.text:00401302      aam    87h
.text:00401304      inc    ecx
.text:00401305      add    al, ch
.text:00401307      add    eax, 83FFFFFFh
.text:0040130C      clc
.text:0040130D      push   dword ptr [ebp+5]
.text:00401310      or     eax, 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:00401313      jmp    short loc_401370
.text:00401313      ; -----
.text:00401315      db  6Ah ; j
.text:00401316      db   0
.text:00401317      db  6Ah ; j
```



# Binaries Analysis




- Does it look correct? no **X**

```
.text:004012FE      db  41h ; A
.text:004012FF      db   0
.text:00401300      db  89h ; ë
.text:00401301      db  15h
;-----
.text:00401302      aam    87h
.text:00401303      inc    ecx
.text:00401304      add    al, ch
.text:00401305      add    eax, 83FFFFFFh
.text:00401307      cld
.text:00401308      push  dword ptr [ebp+5]
.text:00401309      or     eax, 0FFFFFFFh
.text:0040130A      jmp    short loc_401370
;-----
.text:00401315      db  6Ah ; j
.text:00401316      db   0
.text:00401317      db  6Ah ; j
```

Rare instruction: ASCII Adjust AX After Multiply

Compilers sometimes do “silly” things but not this much

# Binaries Analysis




- Does it look correct?

```
.text:00401300 ; -----  
.text:00401300      mov     dword_4187D4, edx  
.text:00401306      call   sub_401210  
.text:0040130B      cmp    eax, 0FFFFFFFFh  
.text:0040130E      jnz   short loc_401315  
.text:00401310      or    eax, 0FFFFFFFFh  
.text:00401313      jmp   short loc_401370  
.text:00401315 ; -----  
.text:00401315
```





# Binaries Analysis



- Does it look correct?: yes ✓


1<sup>st</sup> parameter for a call  
(x86\_64 ABI)

Call to a verifiable  
function

Compares function  
return value against -1


```
.text:00401300 ; -----  
.text:00401300      mov     dword_4187D4, edx  
.text:00401306      call   sub_401210  
.text:0040130B      cmp    eax, 0FFFFFFFFh  
.text:0040130E      jnz   short loc_401315  
.text:00401310      or    eax, 0FFFFFFFFh  
.text:00401313      jmp   short loc_401370  
.text:00401315 ; -----  
.text:00401315
```

# Binaries Analysis




- In previous examples we assume that binary is not obfuscated / packed, and that is genuine compiler assembly
  - Use case example: DLLs or SYS modules differing from security patches
  - When analyzing malware, these assumptions may not be true
- Part of this is “training”

# Binaries Analysis




- Functions identification
  - Exported functions
  - CALL instructions targets
  - Epilogues (ABIs)
- Functions parameters identification
  - Calling conventions (I.e. x86 ABI) to determine parameters count
  - “mov” instructions for size

# Binaries Analysis



- Functions parameters identification
  - Is up to the reverser to determine:
    - Pointers meaning
    - Structures
      - When are their members written or read? That provides semantic value.
  - Data types
    - I.e. are floating point operations applied on a parameter?

# Binaries Analysis



- Calling conventions – Application Binary Interface (ABI)
- How is a function called at the assembly level?
  - Send parameters (values, alignment, structures)
  - Return address
  - Return value
  - Stack balance
  - Which registers are saved? Who is responsible for that?
- A convention is needed: code generated by one compiler may call libraries generated by a different compiler.
- These conventions depend on the CPU architecture and the platform (Windows, Unix, etc.)

# Binaries Analysis




0xFFFFFFFF

Grows



Stack  
frame

0x00000000




x86

Stack

1 stack in user-space per main thread

# Binaries Analysis




```
sub_401060 proc near
```

```
arg_0= dword ptr 8  
arg_4= dword ptr 0Ch  
arg_8= dword ptr 10h  
arg_C= dword ptr 14h
```

```
push    ebp  
mov     ebp, esp  
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_C]  
push    eax  
mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_8]  
push    ecx  
mov     edx, [ebp+arg_4]  
push    edx  
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]  
push    eax
```


# Binaries Analysis



- Calling conventions x86
  - Cdecl
    - Caller function balances the stack (parameters cleanup)
  - Stdcall
    - Callee function balances the stack (parameters cleanup)
    - Common in Windows API
  - Fastcall
    - Parameters by registers



# Binaries Analysis



```
int __stdcall function_a(int p1) { return ++p1; }
```

```
int __cdecl function_b(int p1) { return ++p1; }
```

```
int __fastcall function_c(int p1) { return ++p1; }
```

```
void main(void) {  
    printf("function_a: %d\n", function_a(0));  
    printf("function_b: %d\n", function_b(1));  
    printf("function_c: %d\n", function_c(2));  
}
```

**MSVC calling conventions**

# Binaries Analysis



```
int __stdcall function_a(int p1) { return ++p1; }
```

```
push    0  
call    sub_401000  
push    eax  
push    offset aFunction_a@  
call    sub_4010F0  
main function
```

Parameter 1 pushed to the stack

function\_a


Stack is not balanced, callee did it

printf

```
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]  
pop     ebp  
retn   4  
Callee balances the stack,  
freeing up space used for the  
parameter
```

function\_a function

# Binaries Analysis



```
int __cdecl function_b(int p1) { return ++p1; }
```

```
push    1  
call    sub_401020  
add     esp, 4  
push    eax  
push    offset aFunction_bD ;  
call    sub_4010F0
```

Parameter 1 pushed to the stack

function\_b

Stack is balanced, freeing up space used for the parameter

printf


main function

```
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]  
pop     ebp  
retn
```

Callee does not balance the stack

function\_b function

# Binaries Analysis



```
int __fastcall function_c(int p1) { return ++p1; }
```

```
mov     ecx, 2  
call   sub_401040  
push   eax  
push   offset aFunction_cD  
call   sub_4010F0
```

Parameter 1 loaded in a register


function\_c

Stack remains balanced

printf


main function

# Binaries Analysis



- Variables identification
  - Similar to parameters identification
  - Local variables are referenced (in x86) by EBP - offset
    - Compiler can reference them with ESP
    - Can be held in registers, depending on optimization levels
  - Global variables are references to .data (initialized) and .bss (uninitialized) segments

# Binaries Analysis



```
sub_4026F4 proc near
```

```
var_C= dword ptr -0Ch
```

```
var_8= dword ptr -8
```

```
var_1= byte ptr -1
```

```
arg_0= dword ptr 8
```

```
arg_4= dword ptr 0Ch
```

```
mov     edi, edi
```

```
push   ebp
```

```
mov     ebp, esp
```

```
sub     esp, 0Ch
```



```
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
```

```
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_1]
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_8], eax
```


```
mov     [ebp+var_C], eax
```

# Binaries Analysis



## Basic blocks


# Binaries Analysis



- Cross references identification
  - Based on offsets
    - + symbols information
    - + value (I.e. String)
  - Bidirectional search
  - Good strategy to understand what a function does




# Binaries Analysis




```
push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub     esp, 0Ch
push   offset LibFileName ; "test.dll"
call   ds:LoadLibraryA
```

# Binaries Analysis



- Patterns identification
  - From assembly to source code
    - A disassembler parses opcodes and shows the instructions mnemonic.
    - A decompiler makes high level abstractions to show C code or pseudo-code.

# Binaries Analysis



```
call    _puts
mov     eax, [esp+14h]
cmp     eax, 0Ah
jg      short loc_8048814
```


```
mov     eax, [esp+14h]
cdq
xor     eax, edx
sub     eax, edx
mov     [esp+20h], eax
cmp     dword ptr [esp+20h], 80h
ja      short loc_8048814
```

```
cmp     dword ptr [esp+20h], 0
jnz     short loc_804881C
```

```
loc_8048814:
mov     dword ptr [esp+1Ch], 0
```



# Binaries Analysis




```
call    _puts  
mov     eax, [esp+14h]  
cmp     eax, 0Ah  
jg      short loc_8048814
```

```
mov     eax, [esp+14h]  
cdq  
xor     eax, edx  
sub     eax, edx  
mov     [esp+20h], eax  
cmp     dword ptr [esp+20h], 80h  
ja      short loc_8048814
```

```
cmp     dword ptr [esp+20h], 0  
jnz     short loc_804881C
```

```
loc_8048814:  
mov     dword ptr [esp+1Ch], 0
```


# Binaries Analysis



- Patterns identification

```
if ( condition_1 && condition_2 ... &&  
condition_n) {  
    do;  
}
```


# Binaries Analysis



```
loc_80489C4:  
lea     eax, [esp+13h]  
mov     [esp+4], eax  
mov     dword ptr [esp], offset aC ; "%C"  
call   ___isoc99_scanf  
movzx  eax, byte ptr [esp+13h]  
cmp     al, 0Ah  
jnz     short loc_80489C4
```



# Binaries Analysis



**loc\_80489C4:**

lea eax, [esp+13h]

mov [esp+4], eax

mov dword ptr [esp], offset aC ; "%c"


call isoc99 scanf

movzx eax, byte ptr [esp+13h]

cmp al, 0Ah

jnz short loc\_80489C4

# Binaries Analysis




- Patterns identification


```
while ( condition_1 ) {  
    do;  
}
```





# Binaries Analysis




```
mov     ebp, esp
sub     esp, 0Ch
mov     [ebp+var_C], 1
mov     [ebp+var_8], 3
mov     [ebp+var_4], 0
jmp     short loc_401026
```



# Binaries Analysis





# Binaries Analysis





- Patterns identification

```
int max = 3;  
for ( int i = 0; i < max; i++ ) {  
    ...  
}
```


# Binaries Analysis



# Binaries Analysis



# Binaries Analysis



- Patterns identification

```
if ( condition_1 ) {  
    goto error;  
}
```

```
}
```


```
if ( condition_2 ) {  
    goto error;  
}
```

```
}
```

```
error:
```

```
    return 0;
```

# Binaries Analysis



```
mov     [ebp+var_C], 33h
mov     [ebp+var_8], 4
mov     eax, [ebp+var_1C]
mov     [ebp+var_18], eax
cmp     [ebp+var_18], 5 ;
ja      short loc_40106A ;
```

```
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_18]
jmp     ds:off_401084[ecx*4] ;
```


```
loc_401058:
mov     [ebp+var_14], 3
jmp     short loc_401071
```

```
loc_401061:
mov     [ebp+var_14], 6
jmp     short loc_401071
```

```
loc_401071:
var     03h  03h  03h
```



# Binaries Analysis



```
mov     [ebp+var_c], 33h
mov     [ebp+var_8], 4
mov     eax, [ebp+var_1c]
mov     [ebp+var_18], eax
cmp     [ebp+var_18], 5 ; switch 6 cases
ja     short loc_40106A ; jumtable 0040103F
```

```
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_18]
jmp     ds:off_401084[ecx*4] ; switch jump
```

```
loc_401058: ; jumtable 0040103F case 3
mov     [ebp+var_14], 3
jmp     short loc_401071
```

```
loc_401061: ; jumtable 0040103F case 4
mov     [ebp+var_14], 6
jmp     short loc_401071
```

```
loc_401071:
var     03v  03v  03v
```




# Binaries Analysis



- Patterns identification

```
switch ( variable ) {  
    case 0:  
        ...  
        break;  
    case 1:  
        ...  
        break;  
}
```


# Binaries Analysis



```
mov     [ebp+var_14], 1
mov     [ebp+var_10], 2
mov     [ebp+var_C], 33h
mov     [ebp+var_8], 4
mov     [ebp+var_18], offset sub_401000
call    [ebp+var_18]
xor     eax, eax
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_4]
xor     ecx, ebp
call    @__security_check_cookie@4 ; __security
mov     esp, ebp
pop     ebp
```



# Binaries Analysis



```
mov     [ebp+var_14], 1
mov     [ebp+var_10], 2
mov     [ebp+var_C], 33h
mov     [ebp+var_8], 4
mov     [ebp+var_18], offset sub_401000
call    [ebp+var_18]
xor     eax, eax
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_4]
xor     ecx, ebp
call    @__security_check_cookie@4 ; __security
mov     esp, ebp
pop     ebp
```

# Binaries Analysis




- Patterns identification

```
int (* f_ptr ) () = f;
```


```
(* f_ptr ) ();
```

# Binaries Analysis




- Dynamic analysis on executable code
  - IDA Pro (debugger)
  - Other debuggers
    - Windbg, gdb, Ollydbg, etc.
  - strace (Linux)
  - API monitor (Windows)
  - Wireshark

# Binaries Analysis




- Dynamic analysis on executable code
  - Tools to monitor registry changes (Windows)
  - Tools to monitor filesystem changes
  - Integrated suite: Cuckoo

# Binaries Analysis



- Execution traces
  - Do not stop execution (in opposition to breakpoints) and record:
    - Instructions execution
    - Memory reads or writes
      - From which instruction was memory accessed
    - Other state changes (i.e. registers)
    - Thread that executed
    - Other information (i.e. call-graph)
  - May generate too much information. Filtering is required.

# Binaries Analysis




- Trace example

0000F20			ST0=FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF ST1=FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF ST2=FFFFFFF
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+3	sub esp, 14h	ESP=0042FA34 PF=0
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+6	push ebx	ESP=0042FA30
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+7	cpuid	EAX=00000000 EBX=00000000 ECX=00000000 EDX=00000000
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+9	rdtsc	EAX=DDA53517 EDX=000002FE
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+B	mov [ebp+var_C], eax	
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+E	mov [ebp+var_8], edx	
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+11	mov [ebp+var_4], 0	
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+18	jmp short loc_2F13E3	
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0:loc_2F13E3	cmp [ebp+var_4], 8	CF=1 AF=1 SF=1
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+27	jnb short loc_2F13FE	
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+29	mov ecx, 8	ECX=00000008
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+2E	sub ecx, [ebp+var_4]	CF=0 AF=0 SF=0
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+31	mov edx, [ebp+var_4]	EDX=00000000
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+34	mov al, [ebp+ecx+var_D]	EAX=DDA53500
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+38	mov byte ptr [ebp+edx+var_14], al	
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+3C	jmp short loc_2F13DA	
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0:loc_2F13DA	mov eax, [ebp+var_4]	EAX=00000000
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+1D	add eax, 1	EAX=00000001
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+20	mov [ebp+var_4], eax	
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0:loc_2F13E3	cmp [ebp+var_4], 8	CF=1 PF=1 AF=1 SF=1
0000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+27	jnb short loc_2F13FE	




# Binaries Analysis



- Trace example (filtering by 0x42FA48)

00000F20	.text:sub_2F13C0+45	mov esp, ebp	ESP=0042FA48
00000F20	.text:_main+16	call sub_2F1210	ESP=0042FA48
00000F20	.text:sub_2F1210+1	mov ebp, esp	debug021:0042FA48: 58
00000F20	.text:sub_2F1210+1	mov ebp, esp	EBP=0042FA48
00000F20	.text:sub_2F1000+5E	pop ebp	EBP=0042FA48 ESP=0042FA24
00000F20	.text:sub_2F1000+5E	pop ebp	EBP=0042FA48 ESP=0042FA24
00000F20	.text:sub_2F1000+5E	pop ebp	EBP=0042FA48 ESP=0042FA24
00000F20	.text:sub_2F1210:loc_2F12E2	mov esp, ebp	ESP=0042FA48
00000F20	.text:_main+27	push 0 ; bInitialOwner	ESP=0042FA48
00000F20	KERNELBASE:kernelbase_CreateMutexA+A	jz short near ptr unk_768717C8	debug021:0042FA48: 00
00000F20	.text:_main+38	push 0 ; dwCreationFlags	ESP=0042FA48
00000F20	kernel32:kernel32_CreateThread+D	push dword ptr [ebp+14h]	debug021:0042FA48: 00
00000F20	.text:_main+50	push 0 ; dwCreationFlags	ESP=0042FA48
00000F20	kernel32:kernel32_CreateThread+D	push dword ptr [ebp+14h]	debug021:0042FA48: 00
00000F20	.text:_main+6B	push eax ; hObject	ESP=0042FA48
00000F20	kernel32:kernel32_WaitForSingleObject+D	call near ptr kernel32_WaitForSingleObjectEx	debug021:0042FA48: 34


# Binaries Analysis



- Which is the proper strategy to analyze an...
  - “stripped” binary? (no symbols)
  - obfuscated or packed binary?
- Code-coverage in dynamic analysis:
  - how can we trigger every possible execution flow?




# Binaries Analysis



- Answer is on case-by-case basis and will probably involve a combination of different techniques
  - Static analysis may require a high effort: too much information to analyze!
  - Dynamic analysis based on debugging may require a high effort too
  - Dynamic analysis based on monitoring tools may not be enough


# Question



Which approach would you use to analyze a binary that encrypts communications with a custom cryptographic algorithm?



# Lab 3.1



Analyze the binary, describe the logic and extract communicated data



# References

- <https://github.com/cuckoosandbox/cuckoo>
- The IDA Pro Book

