Reverse Engineering Class 9

Exploit Writing II Use After Free





Polymorphism and virtual methods

```
class A {
public:
    void m1();
    virtual void m2();
};
class B : public A {
public:
    void m1();
    void m1();
    void m2();
};
```

```
A* a = new A();
A* a2 = new B();
A a3;
B* b = new B();
B* b2 = new A();
B b3;
```

Which method is executed?

a->m1(); b->m1(); a->m2(); b->m2(); a2->m1(); a2->m2(); a3.m1(); b3.m1(); a3.m2(); b3.m2();





```
class A {
public:
    void m1();
    virtual void m2();
};
```

```
class B : public A {
public:
    void m1();
    void m2();
};
```

```
A* a = new A();
A* a2 = new B();
A a3;
B* b = new B();
B* b2 = new A();
B b3;
```

Which method is executed?

a->m1(); // A::m1 b->m1(); // B::m1

a->m2(); // A::m2 b->m2(); // B::m2

a2->m1(); // A::m1 a2->m2(); // B::m2

a3.m1(); // A::m1 b3.m1(); // B::m1

a3.m2(); // A::m2 b3.m2(); // B::m2





- Virtual methods
 - What to execute is decided in run time


```
class A {
    public:
        virtual void m();
    };
    class B : public A {
        public:
        void m();
    };
    };
```



- Virtual methods
 - There isn't a single possible target to generate a direct CALL in compile time
 - Indirect CALL: depends on run time data
 - Have a performance cost
 - In C++ a method is not virtual unless declared as such
 - In Java methods are virtual by default. However, optimizations are made to avoid performance penalty when not needed

Non-virtual methods


- Target is known in compile time and is unique
- Better performance





- Virtual methods table (vtable)
 - If a class has virtual methods, there is a pointer in the object to a table with pointers to virtual methods
 - If there are no virtual methods, this pointer does not exist and memory is saved (the object looks like a C struct)
 - When a class inherits from other classes, vtable includes vtables from parent classes





A pointer to m2 implementation is in position #2 of both vtables. Which vtable will be used in run time is unknown, but position will be #2 for m2.



(gdb) x/6i \$rip			
=> 0x400a6c	<main()+278>:</main()+278>	mov	-0x28(%rbp),%rax
0x400a70	<main()+282>:</main()+282>	mov	(%rax),%rax
0x400a73	<main()+285>:</main()+285>	mov	(%rax),%rax
0x400a76	<main()+288>:</main()+288>	mov	-0x28(%rbp),%rdx
	<main()+292>:</main()+292>	mov	%rdx,%rdi
0x400a7d	<main()+295>:</main()+295>	callq	*%rax

Call site for a virtual method



- %rax = *(%rbp 0x28)
 - Read the pointer to the object from a local variable and store the value in %rax register
 - I.e: variable "a"
 - Object can be of A or B type, depending o what has been assigned to "a" variable in run time
- %rax = *(%rax)
 - %rax now points to A or B class vtable



- %rax = *(%rax)
 - %rax now points to "m" method (located in position 0 of the vtable)
 - "m" method is in the same position 0 of A and B class vtables
 - Code dereferences "m" method without knowing from which vtable will be obtained in run time. All it's known is that the method is in vtable's first entry



- %rdx = *(%rbp 0x28)
- %rdi = %rdx
 - In %rdi goes the first parameter for the called function (x86_64 SystemV ABI)
 - This first parameter is a pointer to the object ("this" in C++)
- CALL *%rax
 - Indirect call to "m" method. "m" address was previously loaded in %rax register



- The interesting thing, from the exploitation point of view, is the mix between data and code: there are pointers to code in data areas
 - The object (and, thus, the pointer to the vtable) may be located in the stack, heap or .data sections
 - vtables are in .rodata section
 - Vtable entries point to methods located in .text section



(gdb) x/1xg \$rax 0x614c20: 0x0000000000000000098 (gdb) x/1xg *\$rax 0x400e98 <_ZTV1A+16>: 0x00000000000400ca2 (gdb) x/1i **\$rax 0x400ca2 <A::m2()>: push %rbp

Class A vtable



Is there polymorphism in C?





typedef struct _super_t { void(*m)(void); // virtual method } super_t;

((super_t*)a)->m = mA;

(*(a->m))();





Demo 9.1

Example of polymorphism in C




```
class A {
public:
    virtual void m();
};
```

int main() {
 A* a = new A();
 delete a;
 ...
 a->m();
 return 0;
}


What is the problem?














```
class A {
                          int main() {
public:
                            A^* = f();
  virtual void m();
};
                             a->m();
                             return 0;
A* f(void){
                          }
  A a;
  return &a;
}
```


What is the problem?














```
A* a_global;
```

What is the problem?




 Looks like a trivial problem but it's not: in complex systems there may be references (pointers) to an object from different places and can be even modified concurrently





 If an object is deleted, what should be done with references? While deleting references, what would happen if a different thread uses a reference concurrently?





- What is the object life cycle and how to manage it?
- Temporary objects
 - Stored in the stack
 - Do not save references in global variables
 - Do not send references up in the stack
 - It's safe to send references down in the stack



- Pointers in C++11 / boost:
 - std::unique_ptr
 - std::shared_ptr
 - std::weak_ptr
- RAII pattern: Resource Acquisition is Initialization
 - Memory is just another resource



- std::unique_ptr
 - std::make_unique<A>(...);
 - There is no copy constructor, only move constructor
 - 1 object 1 pointer relationship
 - No synchronization cost
 - Small memory footprint: size of a raw pointer
 - Raw pointer can be accessed and " \rightarrow " operator used



GNU ISO C++ (unique_ptr.h)

```
/** Takes ownership of a pointer.
 */
explicit
unique ptr(pointer p) noexcept
: M t()
std::<u>get<0>(_M_t) = __p;</u>
static assert(!is pointer<deleter type>::value,
       "constructed with null function pointer deleter");
}
```



GNU ISO C++ (unique_ptr.h)

/// Move constructor. unique_ptr(unique_ptr&& __u) noexcept : _M_t(__u.release(), std::forward<deleter_type>(__u.get_deleter())) { }



GNU ISO C++ (unique_ptr.h)

```
/// Dereference the stored pointer.
typename add_lvalue_reference<element_type>::type
operator*() const
{
    glibcxx_assert(get() != pointer());
return *get();
}
```

```
/// Return the stored pointer.
```

```
pointer
```

```
operator->() const noexcept
```

```
_GLIBCXX_DEBUG_PEDASSERT(get() != pointer());
return get();
```



GNU ISO C++ (unique_ptr.h)

/// Destructor, invokes the deleter if the stored pointer is not null.

```
~unique_ptr() noexcept
{
  auto& __ptr = std::get<0>(_M_t);
  if (__ptr != nullptr)
    get_deleter()(__ptr);
  __ptr = pointer();
 }
```



- std::shared_ptr
 - std::make_shared<A>(...);
 - There is copy constructor
 - 1 object, 1 or more pointers relationship
 - Synchronization cost is paid. Object is destroyed when the last reference is lost
 - Memory footprint: (raw pointer size)*2
 - Raw pointer can be accessed and " \rightarrow " operator used



• GNU ISO C++ (shared_ptr.h)

```
template<typename _Tp, _Lock_policy _Lp>
    class __shared_ptr
    {
    ...
    _Tp* _M_ptr; // Contained pointer.
    _shared_count<_Lp> _M_refcount; // Reference
counter.
    };
```



• GNU ISO C++ (shared_ptr.h)

template<typename _Tp1>
 __shared_ptr(const __shared_ptr<_Tp1,
 Lp>& __r)
 : _M_ptr(__r._M_ptr),
 M_refcount(__r._M_refcount) // never throws

{ __glibcxx_function_requires(_ConvertibleCon
cept<_Tp1*, _Tp*>) }

Copy constructor



- std::weak_ptr
 - Created in relationship to a shared_ptr
 - Does not count toward object's destruction
 - weak ptr can only be used to obtain a shared_ptr (if the object was not destroyed)
 - While object is in use, a shared ptr that prevents deletion exists



- Good practice: assign NULL value to variables that held an object pointer after freeing it
- Languages like Java, .NET, Python, etc. do not allow to manage memory manually *
 - * with the exception of specific APIs (I.e. Unsafe in Java)
 - Polymorphism is implemented with vtables too
 - Not vulnerable to Use After Free unless there is a bug in the VM
 - Performance and memory footprint costs are paid



Demo 9.2

Stack Use After Free exploitation (kernel space)




- Exploiting Use After Free in heap has additional challenges: how to overwrite freed space? How to predict memory location where "fake vtable" would be located?
- Heap is a memory area where process can store variable (and unknown) length data, in run time. I.e. arrays, streams, objects, etc.
- Processes generally use dynamic memory allocators in user space (provided by the operating system) to manage the Heap:
 - Simplification or abstraction (reserved vs. committed memory)
 - Granularity (allocate a few bytes only)
 - Contiguous memory at virtual addressing level (not necessarily at physical addressing level)
 - Anti-fragmentation and memory management (caches)



- Every process has at least 1 heap
- Windows has multiple APIs to manage memory and supports multiple heaps:
 - HeapCreate / HeapDelete
 - HeapAlloc / HeapFree
 - VirtualAlloc / VirtualFree
 - malloc (MSVCRT)
- In Linux
 - mmap is used to allocate memory segments
 - brk / sbrk are used increase or reduce the heap size
 - malloc (glibc)



- brk syscall (Linux)
 - Defined in mm/mmap.c (kernel)
 - Changes "data segment" size (heap)
 - This means mapping or unmapping physical memory
 - Heap grows towards higher virtual memory addresses (stack towards lower virtual memory addresses)





• brk syscall (Linux)

```
struct mm_struct {
```

```
...
unsigned long start_brk, brk, start_stack;
...
}
```

include/linux/mm_types.h (Linux kernel)

mm_struct structure describes a process memory, at kernel level. In particular, start_brk and brk show the heap location.



```
int main(void) {
    char* buff = (char*)malloc(1);
    if (buff != NULL) {
        free(buff);
        buff = NULL;
    }
    return 0;
}
```

When calling "malloc" for the first time, glibc has to initialize and extend the process heap. Brk syscall will be used for that.

Process map before calling malloc:

```
...
00601000-00602000 ... main
7ffff7a24000-7ffff7bce000 ... libc.so.6
```



In this example case, glibc executes brk syscall with value 0x623000.

When entering sys_brk (kernel): (gdb) print/x ((struct mm_struct*)(current->mm))->start_brk \$18 = 0x602000 (gdb) print/x ((struct mm_struct*)(current->mm))->brk \$19 = 0x602000

Process heap has size 0 at this moment.

When finalizing sys_brk:

(gdb) print/x ((struct mm_struct*)(current->mm))->start_brk \$18 = 0x602000 (gdb) print/x ((struct mm_struct*)(current->mm))->brk \$19 = 0x623000



Process map when returning from sys_brk syscall:

00601000-00602000 rw-p ... main 00602000-00623000 rw-p ... [heap] 7ffff7a24000-7ffff7bce000 r-xp ... libc.so.6

- -

malloc finally returned address 0x602260, within heap segment.



```
int main(void) {
    unsigned int iter_count = 10U;
    char* previous_buff = NULL;
```

```
while (iter_count-- > 0U) {
    char* buff = (char*)malloc(1U);
    printf("Buff: %p - Delta with previous: %lu\n", buff,
    (unsigned long)(buff - previous_buff));
    previous_buff = buff;
    }
    return 0;
}
```



Buff: 0x1ca4**260** - Delta with previous: 30032480 Buff: 0x1ca4**690** - Delta with previous: 1072 Buff: 0x1ca4**6b0** - Delta with previous: 32 Buff: 0x1ca4**6d0** - Delta with previous: 32 Buff: 0x1ca4**6f0** - Delta with previous: 32

Buff: 0x9b8**260** - Delta with previous: 10191456 Buff: 0x9b8**690** - Delta with previous: 1072 Buff: 0x9b8**6b0** - Delta with previous: 32 Buff: 0x9b8**6d0** - Delta with previous: 32 Buff: 0x9b8**6f0** - Delta with previous: 32



Memory addresses when memory chunks are allocated are not completely random. From the previous traces it's possible to assume:

- Allocator tries not to fragment the memory (contiguous allocations)
- Minimum size between 2 chunks (including metadata) is 32 bytes
- Even though addresses are different, endings are equal due to alignment

If a chunk in the middle of this sequence is freed and a new allocation of the same size happens, what's the most likely address for the new chunk?



Buff: 0x1f38260 - Delta with previous: 32735840 Buff: 0x1f38690 - Delta with previous: 1072 Buff: 0x1f386b0 - Delta with previous: 32 Buff: 0x1f386d0 - Delta with previous: 32 Buff: 0x1f386f0 - Delta with previous: 32 Buff: 0x1f38710 - Delta with previous: 32

Freed chunk: **0x1f386f0** New buff: **0x1f386f0**

• Looks like there is a cache: next object is allocated in the location of the last freed one. This makes sense to take advantage of the CPU row cache.




- Heap spray technique consists of generating memory allocations of convenient sizes to predict the layout, with a reasonable certainty
- It's not a vulnerability itself, but some allocators try to detect sprays, randomize allocations or separate them in different heaps to make exploitation more difficult (heap isolation)
- There isn't a universal technique: has to be adjusted to each dynamic allocator and heap
- It's not a 100% reliable technique
- In 32 bit platforms a memory exhaustion can be generated because virtual addresses range is comparable to physical addresses range. In 64 bits is not possible




- Example:
 - Objects of a fixed size are allocated all over the heap
 - 1 or more objects in the middle of the heap are freed
 - The allocation of the object vulnerable to use-after-free is generated. This object is then freed. The exact location is not known
 - Objects are conveniently freed
 - New objects of a convenient size are allocated such that there is an overlap with the freed object (vulnerable to use-after-free)
 - We never know exact locations: everything is based on a relative overlap (offsets)









Неар



- How to generate allocations?
 - That depends on the target process. In example, in a browser creating arrays from JavaScript will cause the creation of arrays in the native heap
 - Arrays and strings are interesting for the attacker because of the number of bytes directly controlled in the heap. For this reason, separate heaps are commonly used for them. Other objects may allow to control a smaller number of bytes but may be interesting too
 - It's possible to play with different sizes for the allocations to be managed by different dynamic allocators, and minimize garbage space between them





Image from corelan.be






Image from corelan.be



- Memory safety & Type confusion
 - Managed environments (I.e. VMs such as Java, .NET, etc.) ensure that object fields read/write operations obey the correct type, offset and limits
 - I.e. in the object 0x0 offset there is an int, 4 bytes long. It's not in the offset 0x1 and it's not 8 bytes long.
 - Read/write operations out of data type boundaries are not allowed, and usage has to be according to the data type (i.e. an int cannot be dereferenced as if it were a pointer to an object)



```
class A {
    public int intVar1;
}
```

private static A a = new A();

```
class B {
    public int intVar1;
    public int intVar2;
}
```

private static B b = new B();

Java

- No code (interpreted bytecode or JITted code) can write a String in "a.intVar1", or any value in "a.intVar2"
- Bytecode is verified before being interpreted or compiled

private static void jitlt() {
 a.intVar1 = b.intVar1 % 1;
 b.intVar1 = b.intVar2 % 2;
 b.intVar2 = a.intVar1 % 3;
}

 7fffd8d1f49c:

 7fffd8d1f49f:

 7fffd8d1f4a4:

 7fffd8d1f4aa:

 7fffd8d1f4b0:

 7fffd8d1f4b2:

 7fffd8d1f4b5:

 7fffd8d1f4b5:

mov0mov\$cmp\$jne0xor9cmp\$je0citdidiv9/mov9/

0xc(%rdi),%eax \$0x1,%ebx \$0x8000000,%eax 0x7fffd8d1f4bb %edx,%edx \$0xffffffff,%ebx 0x7fffd8d1f4be

%ebx %edx,0xc(%rsi)



RSI = pointer to "a"

RDI = pointer to "b"

7fffd8d1f4c1: mov **0x10(%rdi),%eax \$0x2,%ebx** 7fffd8d1f4c4: mov 7fffd8d1f4c9: cmp \$0x8000000,%eax **b.intVar1 = b.intVar2 % 2**; 0x7fffd8d1f4e0 7fffd8d1f4cf: jne 7fffd8d1f4d5: xor %edx,%edx RSI = pointer to "a" \$0xffffffff,%ebx 7fffd8d1f4d7: cmp 7fffd8d1f4da: je 0x7fffd8d1f4e3 **RDI** = pointer to "b" 7fffd8d1f4e0: cltd **0xc(%rsi),%eax** 7fffd8d1f4e6: mov 7fffd8d1f4e1: idiv %ebx 7fffd8d1f4e9: mov \$0x3,%esi %edx,0xc(%rdi) 7fffd8d1f4e3: mov 7fffd8d1f4ee: cmp \$0x8000000,%eax 7fffd8d1f4f4: jne 0x7fffd8d1f505 7fffd8d1f4fa: xor %edx,%edx 7fffd8d1f4fc: cmp \$0xffffffff,%esi **b.intVar2** = **a.intVar1** % 3; 7fffd8d1f4ff: 0x7fffd8d1f508 je 7fffd8d1f505: cltd 7fffd8d1f506: idiv %esi 7fffd8d1f508: mov %edx,0x10(%rdi)



- If the VM is tricked to set a pointer to "a" in RDI, there would be a read/write operation out of the A data type boundaries. Memory from a contiguous heap object could be overwritten
- Let's assume that A data type has a reference to B in its first field, over which read/write operations are performed



```
class A {
    public B refToB;
}
```

private static A a = new A();

```
class B {
    public int intVar1;
    public int intVar2;
}
```

```
private static B b = new B();
```

```
private static void jitlt() {
    a.refToB.intVar1 = a.refToB.intVar1 % 1;
    b.intVar1 = b.intVar2 % 2;
```



7fffd8d221a7: mov 7fffd8d221aa: push 7fffd8d221ac: cmp 7fffd8d221b3: je

 7fffd8d22236:
 mov

 7fffd8d22239:
 mov

 7fffd8d2223e:
 cmp

 7fffd8d22244:
 jne

 7fffd8d2224a:
 xor

 7fffd8d2224a:
 cmp

 7fffd8d2224a:
 jne

 7fffd8d2224a:
 cmp

 7fffd8d2224a:
 je

 7fffd8d2224f:
 je

 7fffd8d22255:
 cltd

 7fffd8d22256:
 idiv

 7fffd8d22258:
 mov

Oxc(%rax),%edi %r10 Ox1e420dfd(%rip),%r12 Ox7fffd8d22230 RAX = pointer to "a" EDI = a.refToB (compressed pointer to "b")

0xc(%rdi),%eax \$0x1,%ebx \$0x8000000,%eax 0x7fffd8d22255 %edx,%edx \$0xffffffff,%ebx 0x7fffd8d22258 RDI = a.refToB (uncompressed pointer to "b")

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%edx,0xc(%rdi)

%ebx



- If we manage to set a b' object of B data type in freed memory where an A object was located (keeping the "a" reference), we have control over each read/write operation:
 - b'.intVar1 = set the memory address
 - a.refToB.intVar1 = set the value

Lab



Lab 9.1: Use After Free exploitation in stack (user space)



Lab



Lab 9.2: Exploitation with Heap Spray Set EIP to address 0x41414141



References



- https://www.corelan.be/index.php/2011/12/31/e xploit-writing-tutorial-part-11-heap-sprayingdemystified/
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/ms810603.aspx